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Abstract		
Ethical	issues	are	at	the	heart	of	planning.		Thus,	planning	theory	has	long	displayed	
an	interest	in	debating	both	the	ethical	justification	for	planning	and	how	the	activity	
of	planning	can	be	rendered	more	ethically	sensitive.		However,	comparatively	little	
attention	has	been	shown	 to	how	the	very	constitution	of	 the	planner	as	a	 ‘moral	
subject’	may	 be	 ethically	 problematic	 for	 planning	 practice.	 	 This	 paper	 addresses	
this	 lacuna	 through	 an	 engagement	 with	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Michel	 Foucault.	 In	
contrast	to	how	his	work	is	normally	applied,	this	paper	accords	with	Foucault’s	own	
direction	that	his	later	examination	of	ethics	be	used	as	a	lens	through	which	to	read	
his	 earlier	 analysis	 of	 power	 and	 knowledge.	 Accordingly,	 the	 paper	 first	 outlines	
Foucault’s	 innovative	 reinterpretation	 of	 how	 power	 and	 knowledge	 operate	 in	
society	before	setting	this	within	his	novel	re-conception	of	ethics.		This	theoretical	
exposition	 is	 then	employed	 to	 interpret	material	 drawn	 from	 in-depth	qualitative	
interviews	with	 twenty	 planning	 officers	 working	 in	 a	 range	 of	 different	 contexts.		
The	paper	subsequently	employs	Foucault’s	ethically	informed	reading	of	power	and	
knowledge	 to	 identify	 ethical	 issues	 arising	 from	 the	 approaches	 used	 by	
practitioners	to	 justify	their	planning	activities.	 	The	paper	concludes	by	suggesting	
how	such	issues	can	be	resolved.	
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Introduction		
Ethical	 questions	 concern	 how	 to	 distinguish	 good	 from	 bad	 conduct.	 	 As	 such,	
ethical	 issues	 constitute	 the	 ‘soul	 of	 planning’	 as	 a	 practice	 ‘premised	 on	 the	
expectation	 that	 through	 intervention	 and	 action	 better	 space	 and	 placed-based	
outcomes	 can	 be	 achieved	 than	would	 otherwise	 have	 been	 the	 case’	 (Campbell,	
2012a:	393).		It	is	therefore	unsurprising	that	planning	theory	has	long	displayed	an	
interest	in	debating	both	the	ethical	justification	for	planning	and	how	the	activity	of	
planning	 can	 be	 rendered	more	 ethically	 sensitive.	 	 However,	 comparatively	 little	
attention	has	been	shown	to	the	ways	in	which	the	very	constitution	of	the	planner	
as	a	 ‘moral	 subject’	may	be	ethically	problematic	 for	planning	practice.	 This	paper	
seeks	 to	 address	 this	 lacuna	 by	 demonstrating	 the	 value	 of	 Michel	 Foucault’s	
frequently	 neglected	 later	 philosophy	 for	 elucidating	 the	 effects	 of	 ethical	
assumptions	on	the	conduct	of	planning.			
	
Attempts	to	identify	ways	to	inform	what	planning	‘ought’	to	do	are	part	of	a	deep	
tradition	 of	 validating	 governmental	 action	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 ‘common	 good’.		
However,	rigorous	effort	to	methodically	scrutinise	the	particular	ethical	aspects	of	
planning	 as	 a	 professional	 practice	 dates	 back	 just	 a	 few	 decades	 (Campbell	 and	
Marshall,	2002a;	Hendler,	1995;	Pløger	2004;	Thomas,	1994;	Wachs,	1985).		Perhaps	
most	 markedly	 reflecting	 the	 fruits	 of	 these	 efforts	 has	 been	 the	 widespread	
attention	 shown	 to	 the	 Habermasian	 inspired	 collaborative	 turn	 in	 planning	
(Forester,	1999;	Healey,	2003;	Innes	and	Booher,	2003).		This	approach	endeavours	
to	 identify	 and	 rectify	 issues	 of	 power	 asymmetries	 in	 planning	 by	 seeking	 to	
engender	 rational	 dialogue	 and	 promote	 the	 equal	 right	 to	 a	 hearing	 among	
interlocutors.	 However,	 this	 approach	 has	 received	 criticism	 from	 those	 who	
consider	 the	 intrinsically	political	 nature	of	planning	 to	mean	 that	 issues	of	power	
can	 never	 be	 properly	 erased	 from	 how	 people	 and	 places	 are	 governed	 (Huxley,	
2000;	Yiftachel,	1998).		Some	critics	go	further	by	contending	that	the	pleas	for	‘fair	
procedure’	 at	 the	 core	 of	 collaborative	 planning	 may	 simply	 institutionalise	 a	
platitudinal	 performance	 of	 concern	 for	 equality	without	 actually	 resolving	 deeply	
entrenched	 problems	 of	 community	 marginalisation	 (Allmendinger	 and	 Tewdwr-
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Jones,	 2002;	 Tewdwr-Jones	 and	 Allmendinger,	 1998).	 	 This	 evaluation	 has	 steered	
others	along	a	different	track	where	a	distinct	power-aware	approach	to	planning	is	
promoted.	 	 Here,	 academics	 such	 as	 Roweis	 (1983)	 and	 Yiftachel	 (1998)	 have	
explored	the	‘dark	side	of	planning’	as	manifested	in	a	bias	against	the	inclusion	of	
minorities	 in	 the	planning	of	 urban	environments	 and	 in	 the	 institutionalisation	of	
oppressive	planning	practices	 (Yiftachel	et	al.,	2001).	 	Flyvbjerg	 (1996)	 in	particular	
has	 expanded	 on	 this	 concept	 by	 employing	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Friedrich	Nietzsche	
and	Michel	Foucault	to	analyse	how	ideals	may	be	warped	in	application	through	the	
power-infused	 operation	 of	 (‘real’)	 planning	 rationality	 (Realrationalität).	 	 Here,	
planning	activity	is	understood	as	open	to	corruption	as	backstage	politics	delineate	
the	 forms	 of	 rationality	 ostensibly	 employed	 by	 planning.	 	 Ultimately,	 this	 leads	
Flyvbjerg	to	conclude	that	‘[d]efining	reality	by	defining	rationality	is	a	principal	way	
by	which	power	exerts	itself...because	rationality	and	knowledge	are	power’	(1998:	
227).			
	
However,	Flyvbjerg	and	Richardson	(2002)	hold	that	it	is	possible	to	negotiate	a	path	
out	of	planning’s	dark	side	by	unveiling	and	questioning	the	operation	of	power	 in	
planning,	 rather	 than	 ignoring	 its	 inherent	 presence.	 	 This	 distinct	 power-aware	
approach	to	planning	has	led	Flyvbjerg	(2004)	to	suggest	that	the	planner	refocus	on	
himself	 or	 herself	 as	 the	 object	 of	 concern.	 	 The	 emphasis	 of	 this	 ‘phronetic’	
approach	is	on	how	power	asymmetries	exert	a	restraining	effect	on	people,	with	an	
associated	recommendation	that	planners	reflect	on	what	they	ought	to	do	in	light	
of	such	knowledge.		While	this	work	has	done	much	to	illuminate	the	role	of	power	
in	planning	practices,	it	primarily	conceives	planners	as	operating	in	situations	where	
they	 are	 aware	 of	 the	 power	 dynamics	 at	 play.	 	 As	 such,	 it	 paints	 a	 picture	 of	
planning	 as	 a	 place	 where	 practitioners	 can	 be	 held	 morally	 culpable	 for	
marginalising	 certain	 interests	 in	 the	 planning	 arena.	 	 Certomà	 (2015)	 has	 helped	
address	 this	 issue	 in	 planning	 theory	 by	 demonstrating	 the	 value	 of	 expanding	
Flyvbjerg’s	 approach	 via	 the	 Foucaultian	 concept	 of	 ‘governmentality’.	 	 Broadly	
conceived,	 this	 concept	 addresses	 ‘[h]ow	 we	 think	 about	 governing	 others	 and	
ourselves	in	a	wide	variety	of	contexts’	(Dean,	2010:	267).		It	refers	to	the	different	
rationalities	 or	 ‘mentalities	 of	 government’	 (Rose	 and	 Miller,	 1992)	 that	 guide	
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perspectives	 on	 thinking	 and	 doing.	 	 By	 focusing	 on	 how	 diffuse	 forms	 of	 control	
inform	 popular	 mentalities	 (Pløger,	 2008)	 and	 by	 expanding	 the	 concept	 of	
government	 beyond	 the	 classically	 conceived	 ‘State’,	 it	 advances	 a	 more	 subtle	
understanding	 of	 how	 a	 variety	 of	 influences	 emanating	 from	 an	 array	 of	 sources	
shape	 individual	 and	 communal	 behaviour	 (Certomà,	 2015;	 Huxley,	 2006).			
Nonetheless,	 to	date	such	work	remains	 largely	 focused	on	the	analytics	of	power,	
rather	than	on	the	ethical	questions.		This	paper	seeks	to	address	this	lacuna	in	the	
application	 of	 Foucaultian	 theory	 by	 employing	 interview	material	 to	 explore	 how	
the	 planner	 as	 moral	 subject	 is	 constituted	 in	 ways	 that	 may	 be	 ethically	
problematici.		However,	in	contrast	to	how	Foucault’s	work	is	normally	applied,	this	
paper	 accords	 with	 Foucault’s	 direction	 that	 his	 later	 work	 on	 ethics	 be	 used	 to	
interpret	his	earlier	analysis	on	power	and	knowledge	(Flynn,	2010).	
	
Thus,	the	next	section	outlines	Foucault’s	innovative	reinterpretation	of	how	power	
and	knowledge	operate	in	society	before	setting	this	within	his	novel	re-conception	
of	 ethics.	 	 This	 theoretical	 exposition	 is	 then	 employed	 to	 analyse	 the	 interview	
material	 in	order	to	establish	how	the	interactions	between	power,	knowledge	and	
ethics	 forge	particular	 subject	positions	 that	may	 generate	potentially	 problematic	
consequences	 in	 terms	 of	 planning	 ethics.	 	 The	 following	 section	 then	 revisits	
Foucault’s	 work	 to	 formulate	 a	 nuanced	 interpretation	 of	 issues	 illustrated	 in	 the	
interviews.	 	 Specifically,	 this	 section	 of	 the	 paper	 presents	 a	 means	 by	 which	 to	
resolve	 potential	 tensions	 arising	 between	 the	 ostensible	 ethical	 intentions	 of	
planners	and	the	potentially	problematic	ethical	consequences	of	their	activities.			
The	Moral	Subject	of	Power	
Power	
Foucault	destabilises	presumptions	of	‘the	given’	in	social	relations.	 	To	this	extent,	
‘Uncritical	acceptance	of	anything	presented	as	natural,	necessary,	or	ineluctable	is	
problematic	 from	 a	 Foucaultian	 perspective’	 (Taylor,	 2011:	 4).	 	 Such	 uncritical	
acceptance	 is	 understood	 to	 permit	 the	 emergence	 of	 static	 power	 relations	 that	
facilitate	 the	 dominance	 of	 a	 restricted	 array	 of	 reasoning	 and	 behaviour	 that	 is	
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considered	 to	be	 legitimate.	 	As	a	consequence,	alternative	modes	of	 thinking	and	
doing	 are	 rendered	 invalid	 or	 immoral,	 thereby	 warranting	 social	 sanction	 and	
suppression.	 	 Thus,	 what	 Foucault	 shows	 is	 that	 the	 current	 ‘order	 of	 things’	
(Foucault,	2002)	is	not	inevitable	but	rather	is	contingent	and	so	could	be	otherwise.		
This	project	to	unmask	the	‘ontology	of	the	present’	(Foucault,	1986:	96),	therefore	
focuses	 effort	 on	 exploring	 ‘the	 limits	 of	 ways	 of	 thinking	 to	 find	 possibilities	 for	
thinking	differently’	(Cooper	and	Blair,	2002:	513).			
	
Foucault	attempts	to	reveal	the	contours	of	these	limits	and	expose	their	effects	by	
drawing	 attention	 to	 how	 ‘the	 subject’	 is	 constituted.	 	 By	 proposing	 that	 subjects	
‘are	made’	(Foucault,	1982:	777),	Foucault	challenges	the	long	held	view	in	western	
philosophy	 extending	 from	 The	 Enlightenment	 through	 to	 the	 present,	 that	 the	
subject	 inherently	 possesses	 an	 indelible	 ‘substance’	 which	 endows	 them	 with	
agency	by	means	of	an	objective	rational	faculty	(Foucault,	1987).		Foucault	thereby	
seeks	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 subject	 is	 shaped	 by	 and	 transmits	 socio-cultural	
norms.		In	this	sense,	a	Foucaultian	approach	to	the	subject	acknowledges	the	role	of	
context	 in	 forging	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 world.	 	 Central	 to	 this	 perspective	 is	
attention	to	the	part	played	by	‘power’.		A	Foucaultian	approach	holds	that	conduct	
is	 governed	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 relations	 of	 power	 and	 forms	 of	 rationality	 that	
mould	perceptions	in	ways	that	privilege	and	marginalise	different	peoples	and	ideas	
by	producing	subjectivities.		Thus,	to	appreciate	the	effects	which	flow	from	the	way	
subjectivities	‘are	made’,	one	must	remain	aware	of	the	role	played	by	power	in	the	
formation	of	such	subjectivities.			
	
From	a	Foucaultian	perspective,	‘power’	is	not	simply	that	which	enables	control	of	
others	by	an	individual	or	group.		Indeed,	Foucault	specifically	differentiates	his	view	
of	power	from	that	of	other	approaches,	be	they	inspired	by	liberal,	psychoanalytical	
or	Marxist	assessments.		Instead,	power	is	conceived	as	a	pervasive	force	inherent	to	
all	 human	 relations	whether	 its	 exertion	 is	 intended	or	 not.	 	 In	 this	 sense,	 ‘Power	
should	be	seen	as	a	verb	rather	than	a	noun,	something	that	does	something,	rather	
than	something	which	is	or	which	can	be	held	onto’	(Mills,	2003:	35).		This	approach	
suggests	that	power	is	‘immanent	in’	(Foucault,	1990:	94)	all	social	relationships.		As	
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such,	 a	 Foucaultian	 view	 holds	 that	 power	 ‘is	 ‘always	 already	 there’,	 that	 one	 is	
never	 ‘outside’	 it’	 (Foucault,	 1980a:	 141).	 	 Foucault	 does	 not	 argue	 that	 all	 social	
relations	are	reducible	to	power	relations.		Rather,	he	simply	suggests	that	power	is	
an	 intrinsic	 quality	 of	 every	 such	 relationship.	 	 Importantly,	 Foucault	 contests	 the	
‘repressive	 hypothesis’	 (Foucault,	 1990:	 7-8)	 that	 conceives	 power	 solely	 as	 an	
oppressive	 force	 curbing	 liberty.	 	 In	 its	 place,	 he	 advances	 a	 more	 nuanced	
understanding	 of	 power	 that	 sees	 it	 as	 concurrently	 ‘productive,	 something	which	
brings	 about	 forms	of	behaviour	 and	events	 rather	 than	 simply	 curtailing	 freedom	
and	constraining	individuals’	(Mills,	2003:	36).		Key	to	this	interpretation	is	attention	
to	the	ways	in	which	power	is	integrally	related	to	knowledge.		
	
Knowledge		
For	Foucault,	there	is	no	disinterested	knowledge.		Accordingly,	‘what	we	take	to	be	
true	 or	 false,	 indeed	 the	 very	 distinction	 itself,	 is	 located	 within	 a	 political	 field’	
(Smart,	2002:	76).	 	This	view	overturns	 the	 traditional	conception	of	knowledge	as	
that	which	both	can	and	should	comprise	universal	‘objective	truths’	existing	beyond	
human	 relations.	 	 Hence,	 from	 a	 Foucaultian	 perspective	 knowledge	 is	 shaped	 by	
and	 shapes	 power	 relations.	 	 As	 power	 is	 an	 omnipresent	 yet	 contingent	
phenomenon	 of	 social	 relationships,	 the	 co-production	 of	 ‘power/knowledge’	
(Foucault,	 1980a)	 is	 thereby	 associated	 with	 the	 context	 of	 its	 production.		
Consequently,	what	is	viewed	as	common-sense	knowledge	in	a	society	is	inherently	
shot	through	with	power.		At	the	heart	of	this	Foucaultian	perspective	is	‘the	will	to	
truth’	(Foucault,	1981:	56).		This	is	understood	as	the	array	of	exclusionary	practices	
that	produce	truths	by	delineating	those	concepts	deemed	false	from	those	that	are	
considered	true.	 	Such	practices	are	contained	within	a	 ‘regime	of	truth’	 (Foucault,	
1980b:	 131)	 that	 determine	 the	 perceived	 veracity	 of	 a	 knowledge	 claim	 and	
allocates	 power	 by	 establishing	 the	 legitimate	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 required	 to	
authoritatively	 enunciate	 on	 an	 issue.	 	 In	 particular,	 Foucault	 stresses	 the	 way	
disciplines	such	as	planning,	prescribe	what	can	be	counted	as	legitimate	knowledge	
within	 a	 subject	 area.	 	 Through	 a	 variety	 of	 in-depth	 historical	 investigations,	 he	
concludes	that	disciplines	produce	truths	by	strict	methodological	rules	and	a	corpus	
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of	factual	propositions	that	allow	for	the	making	of	new	propositions	but	within	the	
limits	of	a	‘regime	of	truth’	(Foucault,	1980b:	131).			
	
This	 conception	of	power/knowledge	has	drawn	criticism	regarding	what	has	been	
interpreted	as	an	emptying	of	agency	from	a	theory	of	social	relations	(Fraser,	1994;	
Taylor,	1986).		Indeed,	Alcoff	contests	that	‘Foucault’s	demotion	of	subjectivity	to	an	
analytic	position	posterior	to	power	results	 in	a	conception	of	subjectivity	deprived	
of	agency’	(Alcoff,	1992:	73).		However,	those	who	defend	the	Foucaultian	approach	
contend	 that	 such	 assertions	 misinterpret	 ‘description’	 for	 ‘prescription’	 by	
confusing	 Foucault’s	 unconventional	 explanation	 of	 power	 dynamics	 with	 a	
conventional	 theory	 that	 offers	 a	 foundational	 account	 of	 power	 in	 contemporary	
society	(Heyes,	2007).		Instead,	the	alternative	portrayal	advanced	by	Foucault	is	an	
original	anti-foundational	and	all-infusing	depiction	of	power/knowledge	that	is	both	
constructive	and	constraining	through	its	broadly	 implicit	modes	of	operation.	 	 It	 is	
this	 innovative	 conception	of	 power/knowledge	 that	 Foucault	 uses	 to	 explain	how	
the	 ‘universal’	 and	 ‘objective’	 rationalities	 of	 The	 Enlightenment	 permeate	 the	
‘ontology	of	the	present’	(Foucault,	1986:	96)	such	that	it	causes	us	to	reflect	upon	
ourselves	 in	 certain	 ways.	 	 Thus,	 in	 his	 later	 works	 Foucault	 became	 acutely	
concerned	 with	 how	 subjects	 that	 ‘are	 made’	 under	 such	 conditions	 can	 assert	
themselves	as	ethical	beings.			
	
Ethics	
The	 concept	 of	 ethics	 for	 Foucault	 differs	 from	 that	 which	 is	 conventionally	
conceived	in	moral	philosophy	as	either	the	study	of	abstract	ethical	models	or	the	
scrutiny	of	normative	criteria	 for	applied	action.	 	 Instead,	he	defines	ethics	as	 ‘the	
kind	 of	 relationship	 you	 ought	 to	 have	with	 yourself’	 (Foucault,	 1984a:	 345).	 	 For	
Foucault,	 ethics	 comprises	 ‘those	 intentional	 and	 voluntary	 actions	 by	which	men	
not	only	set	themselves	rules	of	conduct,	but	also	seek	to	transform	themselves,	to	
change	 themselves	 in	 their	 singular	 being’	 (Foucault,	 1984b:	 10).	 	 In	 this	 sense,	
Foucault’s	 conception	 of	 ethics	 comprises	 a	 self-forming	 activity	 of	 moral	
constitution,	 which	 as	 discussed	 above,	must	 occur	 in	 a	 contingent	 social	 context	
inherently	infused	with	power/knowledge.		Foucault	elaborated	on	his	conception	of	
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ethics	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 his	 book	 ‘The	Uses	 of	 Pleasure’	 (1984b).	 	 In	 essence,	
ethics	 for	 Foucault	 forms	one	element	of	 a	 triad	 comprising	 ‘morality’.	 	 The	other	
elements	of	this	triad	are	the	‘moral	code’	and	‘moral	conduct’.	 	The	moral	code	is	
the	 explicit	 values	 circulating	 and	 broadly	 adhered	 to	 in	 a	 social	 context.	 	 Moral	
conduct	refers	 to	the	activities	of	subjects	 insofar	as	 those	activities	contravene	or	
conform	 to	 the	 moral	 code.	 	 Ethics	 then	 concerns	 the	 self-reflective	 activities	 of	
subjects	 that	mediate	between	 the	moral	code	and	moral	conduct	 so	as	 to	 render	
one	 coherent	 with	 the	 other.	 	 Consistent	 with	 this	 understanding,	 Foucault	 also	
distinguishes	between	moral	obligations	and	ethical	obligations.		A	moral	obligation	
is	a	requirement	of	a	moral	code	that	either	necessitates	or	prohibits	a	specific	kind	
of	 conduct,	whereas	an	ethical	obligation	 is	a	perceived	condition	 for	engendering	
moral	 conduct.	 	 This	 nuanced	 differentiation	 centres	 on	 a	 distinction	 between	
obedience	 and	 reflection.	 	 A	 moral	 obligation	 relates	 to	 conformity	 with	 a	 moral	
code.		In	this	sense,	it	simply	concerns	the	bivalence	of	good	or	bad	moral	conduct.		
In	 contrast,	 an	 ethical	 obligation	 references	 the	 subtle	 interpretations	 of	 those	
recommendations	 for	 how	 to	 realise	 good	 moral	 conduct	 that	 influence	 the	 self-
reflective	 practice	 of	 seeking	 to	 exemplify	 such	 good	 moral	 conduct.	 	 Foucault’s	
examination	 of	 the	 morality	 surrounding	 ancient	 sexual	 practices	 led	 him	 to	
conclude	 that	 ‘the	 moral	 valorization	 of	 conduct	 might	 be,	 as	 it	 was	 with	 the	
ancients,	 weighted	 toward	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 ethical	 obligations,	 or,	 as	 it	 is	 in	
modernity,	weighted	toward	the	satisfaction	of	the	moral	obligations	that	comprise	
a	moral	 code’	 (Robinson,	 18.12.15).	 	He	derived	 this	 conclusion	by	 identifying	 and	
exploring	four	elements	of	morality	that	are	contingent	on	historical	context.		These	
are	namely,	‘ethical	substance’,	‘mode	of	subjectivation’,	‘self-forming	activities’	and	
the	‘telos’	towards	which	one	aims	(Foucault,	1984b).		The	ethical	substance	 is	‘the	
quality	 of	 self	 that	 is	 morally	 problematic,	 taken	 as	 the	 object	 of	 one’s	 ethical	
reflection,	and	transformed	in	one’s	ethical	work’	(Robinson,	18.12.15).		The	mode	of	
subjection	 is	 the	 manner	 by	 which	 the	 subject	 determines	 the	 moral	 code	 and	
appreciates	its	‘moral	obligation’	to	act	in	accordance	with	it.		Self-forming	activities	
comprise	 those	 self-reflective	activities	wherein	 the	 subject	endeavours	 to	 identify	
the	 self-transformative	 ethical	 practices	 through	 which	 he	 or	 she	 can	 meet	 their	
‘moral	obligations’.	 	Finally,	the	telos	 is	the	ideal	state	toward	which	one	aspires	 in	
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‘self-forming	 activities’	 wherein	 the	 morally	 problematic	 ‘ethical	 substance’	 is	
resolved.			
	
Foucault’s	analysis	demonstrated	the	changing	particularities,	yet	consistency	in	the	
relationship	 between	 these	 four	 elements	 throughout	 various	 eras	 in	 the	 ancient	
Mediterranean	 world.	 	 He	 admired	 such	 coherency	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 self-
transformative	approach	to	ethics.		Hence	he	is	critical	of	the	legacy	bequeathed	to	
contemporary	 ethical	 thought	 by	 the	 pivotal	 change	 in	 morality	 he	 identifies	 as	
having	 occurred	 during	 the	 Enlightenment.	 	 Foucault	 terms	 this	 change	 the	
‘Cartesian	moment’	(Foucault,	2005:	14).		Prior	to	this	change,	morality	accented	the	
‘self-forming	activities’	of	those	ethical	concerns	focused	on	‘the	search,	practice	and	
experience	through	which	the	subject	carries	out	the	necessary	transformations	on	
himself’	 (Foucault,	 2005:	 15).	 	 However,	 the	 Enlightenment	 Project’s	 emphasis	 on	
universal	objective	rationality	sought	to	supplant	such	potentially	subjective	activity	
with	 knowledge	 that	 could	 conclusively	 determine	 the	 truth	 or	 falsity	 of	 a	
proposition	 about	 the	 self	 through	 its	 apparent	 logical	 precision.	 	 Thus,	 Foucault	
believes	that	following	the	Cartesian	moment,	attending	to	moral	matters	becomes	
merely	a	rational	epistemic	pursuit	rather	than	a	self-transformative	ethical	activity.		
This	shift	‘construes	moral	self-examination	as	the	act	of	determining	whether	one’s	
intentions	 or	 acts	 are	 consistent	 with	moral	 obligations’	 (Robinson,	 18.12.15).	 	 In	
doing	 so,	 it	 reduces	 one’s	 moral	 existence	 ‘to	 whether	 or	 not	 one	 satisfies	 one’s	
moral	 obligations’	 (Robinson,	 18.12.15).	 	 Thus,	 the	 logic	 of	moral	 self-examination	
subsequent	to	the	Cartesian	moment	turns	on	the	presumption	that	the	problematic	
imprecision	 born	 of	 subjective	 perspectives	 (the	 ‘ethical	 substance’)	 can	 be	
remedied	 through	application	of	 the	unique	objectifying	 rational	 faculty	possessed	
by	humans	(Descartes,	2008).			
	
However,	 according	 to	 Foucault,	 ‘‘The	 Enlightenment’,	 which	 discovered	 the	
liberties,	 also	 invented	 the	 disciplines’	 (Foucault,	 1979:	 222).	 	 Consequently,	 the	
power/knowledge	 that	 specifies	 the	 criteria	 for	 legitimate	 assertions	 in	
contemporary	 morality	 produce	 moral	 certainties	 that	 close	 the	 space	 for	
transformative	practices.		Specifically,	practices	that	may	emanate	from	a	critique	of	
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those	presumptions	underpinning	the	common-sense	knowledge	given	currency	by	
modern	‘regimes	of	truth’	are	effectively	silenced	by	this	pervasive	‘will	to	truth’	of	
universally	 applicable	 rational	objectivity.	 	Accordingly,	 Foucault’s	project	 to	unveil	
the	 ‘ontology	 of	 the	 present’	 (Foucault,	 1986:	 96)	 focuses	 efforts	 on	 how	 to	 re-
engage	 with	 the	 transformative	 potential	 of	 ‘self-forming	 activities’	 by	 advancing	
‘possibilities	 for	 thinking	 differently’	 (Cooper	 and	 Blair,	 2002:	 513).	 	 Foucault,	
thereby	 devised	 four	 interrelated	 questions	 that	 could	 be	 employed	 to	 guide	 the	
exploration	of	morality	in	contemporary	ethical	debate:	
1. Ethical	substance:	Which	 is	 the	aspect	or	part	of	myself	or	my	
behaviour	that	is	concerned	with	moral	conduct?	
2. Mode	of	subjection:	What	is	the	way	in	which	people	are	invited	
or	incited	to	recognise	their	moral	obligations?	
3. Self-forming	 activities:	What	 are	 the	means	 by	 which	 we	 can	
change	ourselves	to	become	ethical	subjects?	
4. Telos:	Which	 is	 the	kind	of	being	to	which	we	aspire	when	we	
behave	in	a	moral	way?	(Foucault,	1984a:	352-355)		
	
Thus,	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 applicability	 and	 elucidatory	 potential	 of	 Foucault’s	
thinking	 for	planning	 theory	and	practice,	 these	questions	are	now	deployed	 in	an	
analysis	 of	 in-depth	 interviews	 conducted	 with	 planners	 drawn	 from	 a	 range	 of	
planning	contexts	in	Ireland.			
The	Morally	Powerful	Subject		
Foucault	 considered	 that	 the	concepts	of	 ‘ethical	 substance’,	 ‘mode	of	 subjection’,	
‘self-forming	activities’	and	‘telos’	exist	in	a	mutually	interactive	and	co-constitutive	
relationship.	 	 However,	 for	 purposes	 of	 coherent	 presentation	 it	 is	 required	 that	
these	 be	 presented	 in	 an	 apparently	 sequential	manner.	 	 Nevertheless,	 we	 stress	
that	this	necessary	mode	of	presentation	should	not	be	confused	with	a	hierarchy	of	
relationships	or	chronology	of	occurrence,	and	that	the	co-constituting	interactions	
between	these	concepts	is	acknowledged.	
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Ethical	Substance		
It	is	possible	to	scrutinise	the	response	of	interviewees	to	questions	concerning	their	
views	on	the	role	of	 the	planner	when	seeking	to	 identify	those	perceptions	about	
the	‘quality	of	the	self’	that	is	potentially	problematic	for	moral	conduct	in	planning.		
This	 is	 because	 shared	 perceptions	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 planner	 reveal	 suppositions	
circulating	 in	 contemporary	 ‘regimes	 of	 truth’	 regarding	 valorised	 characteristics	
considered	 necessary	 to	 counter	 attributes	 of	 the	 self	 that	 are	 potentially	
challenging	for	proper	moral	conduct.	 	While	respondents	were	allowed	autonomy	
in	 expressing	 how	 they	 perceive	 their	 roles,	 the	 results	 exhibit	 a	 high	 degree	 of	
consistency	in	terms	of	the	answers	provided	regardless	of	the	situational	aspects	of	
the	planners	 involved	in	this	study.	 In	this	regard,	 it	 is	worth	noting	that	there	was	
little	ethnic	or	cultural	variation	 in	terms	of	the	planners	 interviewed	with	the	vast	
majority	of	respondents	being	white	Irish,	which	is	broadly	reflective	of	the	nature	of	
the	 planning	 profession	 in	 Ireland	 more	 generally.	 Amongst	 the	 two	 non-Irish	
respondents,	both	originated	 from	the	UK	but	had	spent	 the	vast	majority	of	 their	
lengthy	 careers	 working	 within	 the	 Irish	 planning	 system	 spanning	 a	 number	 of	
decades.	A	relatively	even	mix	of	males	and	females	were	interviewed	and	care	was	
given	to	source	planners	working	within	the	development	management	or	 forward	
planning	(policy	development)	divisions	of	the	local	authorities	investigated	and	at	a	
variety	 of	 scales	 in	 a	 bid	 to	 reduce	 stakeholder	 bias	 (i.e.	 assistant	 executive,	
executive,	and	senior	executive).		Of	note	is	how	such	responses	place	considerable	
emphasis	 on	 the	procedural	 aspects	of	 planning,	which	may	 suggest	 that	planners	
are	uncomfortable	or	unwilling	to	discuss	the	potentially	normative	aspects	of	their	
roles	 (Fox-Rogers	 and	Murphy,	 2015).	 	 Similar	 observations	were	made	 in	 studies	
undertaken	by	Campbell	and	Marshall	 (2002b)	and	Murphy	and	Fox-Rogers	(2015),	
who	 identified	 that	 planners	 can	 be	 hesitant	 to	 talk	 normatively	 about	 the	 values	
that	underpin	 their	work.	 	However,	despite	 such	 initial	hesitation,	 the	majority	of	
planners	 interviewed	 did	 express	 clear	 conceptions	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 planner.	 	 In	
their	responses,	most	interviewees	conveyed	the	view	that	a	planner’s	work	involves	
remaining	‘neutral’.		As	asserted	by	one	senior	executive	planner	working	within	the	
area	of	development	management,	
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My	 role	 is	 clear-cut	 enough.	 It’s	 just	 assessing	 planning	 applications	
and	it’s	taking	the	line	of…we’re	trying	to	promote	development	and	at	
the	same	time	protect	people	from	any	bad	effects	of	development	and	
I	 think	 we’re	 relatively	 neutral.	 (Senior	 Executive	 Planner,	
Development	Management)	
In	addition	to	such	explicit	assessments,	many	implicitly	presume	such	neutrality	as	a	
feature	of	the	roles	they	perform.	 	This	perceived	neutral	role	was	reflected	 in	the	
responses	offered	by	some	of	the	lower	grade	planners	interviewed,	as	exemplified	
by	 the	 following	 self-assessment	 of	 their	 role	 by	 an	 assistant	 executive	 planner	
(lower	grade	position):	
I	 suppose	 at	 the	 moment	 with	 the	 work	 that	 I	 do,	 it’s	 just	 advising	
people	as	to	what	the	planning	policy	and	guidelines	that	are	in	place	
are.		We	don’t	have	any	role	in	shaping	legislation-	that’s	just	handed	
down	 to	 us	 from	 the	 DoE	 [Department	 of	 Environment]	 and	 we	 just	
have	 to	 implement	 it.	 	 (Assistant	 Executive	 Planner,	 Development	
Management)	
Elsewhere,	 another	 planner	 highlighted	 the	 centrality,	 but	 also	 the	 potential	
challenges,	 of	 remaining	 impartial	 in	 their	 daily	 activities	 when	 relaying	 their	
experience	 of	 an	 applicant	 making	 an	 emotional	 plea	 for	 their	 application	 to	 be	
evaluated	 favourably.	Despite	 the	planner	being	of	 the	opinion	 that	 the	 extension	
would	 set	 a	 ‘bad	 precedent	 for	 the	 area’,	 they	 openly	 acknowledged	 that	 the	
planner’s	neutrality	was	compromised	by	virtue	of	the	couple’s	situation,			
I	 have	 had	 an	 occasion	 where	 a	 woman	 who	 was	 pregnant	 came	 in…who	
basically	wanted	to	extend	their	house	but	they	wanted	to	do	something	that	
was	 quite	 different	 to	 the	 other	 houses	 and	 would	 have	 sort	 of	 set	 a	 bad	
precedent	so	we	refused	them	and…I	was	trying	to	 fight	 the	good	fight	and	
look	 at	 “okay	 they’re	 pregnant	 and	 they	 want	 to	 extend	 the	 house”,	 but	
…there	had	been	[similar]	applications	in	the	past…and	we	usually	try	to	fight	
that…So	 you	 know	“Oh	we’re	having	a	 kid	and	all	 that”,	 but	 still	 like	 that’s	
kind	 of	 personal	 circumstances.	 So	 in	 the	 end	 they	 applied	 again	 and	 got	
slightly	 more	 than	 they	 would	 have	 I’d	 say	 if	 we	 had	 managed	 to	 remain	
completely	 impartial	 but	 it	 did	 happen...	 After	 the	 first	 refusal	 they	 came	
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in…and	obviously	the	wife	who	I’d	say	was	between	6	and	8	months	pregnant	
was	sitting	there…	then	she	kind	of	cried	a	bit	and	I	was	thinking	“great	that’s	
just	what	I	need!”.	But	that	kind	of	thing	happens	and	amazingly	is	not	out	of	
this	 world	 you	 know.	 (Executive	 Planner,	 Development	 Management,	
emphasis	added)	
	
The	 same	 planner	 explained	 that	 allowing	 subjectivity	 to	 creep	 into	 the	 decision-
making	process	of	planners	 is	problematic,	not	only	because	of	 the	bad	precedent	
for	development	that	might	emerge,	but	also	because	the	emotional	pitches	made	
by	an	applicant	may	be	more	strategic	in	nature	to	ensure	they	receive	a	favourable	
decision,		
Unfortunately	 you	 sometimes	 find	 out	 afterwards	 that	 these	 things	 aren’t	
true	 as	 well…Like	 again	 one	 planner	 in	 South	 Dublin…had	 a	 family	 on	 the	
phone	 the	 whole	 time	 about	 getting	 an	 extension	 through	 for	 the	 house	
saying	you	know,	“an	expanding	 family”…	and	 then	one	or	 two	weeks	 later	
[after	 receiving	 notification	 that	 the	 extension	 was	 in	 compliance	 with	 the	
conditions	of	the	planning	permission	which	was	granted]…there	was	an	ad	in	
the	 paper	with	 the	 house	 for	 sale	 and	 you	 could	 say...that	 they	 completely	
lied	 about	 the	 whole	 family	 need	 because	 they	 actually	 planned	 to	 move	
after….	(Executive	Planner,	Development	Management).	
	
Consequently,	 the	 ‘ethical	 substance’	 of	 the	 planner	 that	 is	 the	 focus	 of	 moral	
concern	 is	 the	 need	 to	 maintain	 neutrality	 in	 the	 policy	 implementation	 and	
decision-making	 processes.	Whist	 such	 concerns	 undoubtedly	 reflect	 the	 enduring	
influence	 of	 traditional	 rational	 comprehensive	 planning	 approaches	 which	 have	
been	 underpinned	 by	 enlightenment	 principles	 such	 as	 rationality,	
comprehensiveness	 and	 scientific	 objectivity	 (see	 Sandercock,	 1998),	 we	 suggest	
that	the	context	within	which	the	respondents	are	enmeshed	may	also	offer	further	
insights	 in	 this	 regard	 (Lennon,	 2014).	 Specifically,	within	 Irish	 planning	 education,	
academia	 and	 policy	 circles,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 foregrounding	 of	 evidence-based	
planning	 with	 the	 concomitant	 implication	 that	 planning	 can	 be	 conducted	 in	 an	
objective	manner.	Moreover,	 and	as	 suggested	by	 Fox-Rogers	 and	Murphy	 (2015),	
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the	 emphasis	 on	 neutrality	 amongst	 the	 planners	 interviewed	 may	 also	 be	
particularly	pronounced	as	Irish	planners	may	want	to	distance	themselves	from	the	
malpractices	 associated	with	 a	 planning	 system	which	 has	 been	 exposed	 as	 being	
systemically	 corrupt	 (G.o.I,	 2012).	 In	 doing	 so,	 Irish	 planners	may	 seek	 to	 advance	
planning	 practice	 as	 an	 impartially	 executed	 endeavour	 wherein	 the	 profession	
reflects	 the	 public	 good	 by	 objectively	 implementing	 the	 policies	 determined	 by	 a	
publically	elected	council.	 	 	 	Accordingly,	the	planner	must	determine	a	moral	code	
applicable	 to	 their	 work	 that	 would	 enable	 them	 to	 counter	 any	 potential	 for	
subjectivity	 that	 would	 adversely	 affect	 their	 ability	 to	 impartially	 fulfil	 their	
professional	 role.	 	 In	 a	 Foucaultian	 sense,	 the	 planner	 must	 identify	 a	 ‘mode	 of	
subjection’.			
	
Mode	of	Subjection		
Determining	 a	 moral	 code	 commensurate	 with	 the	 desire	 to	 address	 the	 ‘ethical	
substance’	of	potential	bias	 in	decision-making	means	that	 the	planning	profession	
has	 sought	 to	 locate	 a	means	 for	 assisting	 ‘neutral’	 arbitration.	 	 Thus,	 a	 recurrent	
theme	in	interviewee	responses	when	questioned	regarding	how	the	common	good	
is	 determined	 in	 a	 planning	 context	 was	 the	 view	 that	 planning	 involves	 the	
application	of	a	seemingly	impartial	framework	to	decision-making.		This	denotes	the	
lingering	appeal	of	 ‘technical	 rationality’	 (Owens	et	al.,	2004:	1947)	 in	a	 ‘regime	of	
truth’	predicated	on	the	possibility	of	objectively	determining	what	the	public	good	
entails	 in	 a	 given	 decision	 situation.	 	 One	 interviewee	 who	 had	 considerable	
experience	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 policy	 development	 and	 implementation	 succinctly	
conveyed	the	perceived	moral	common-sense	of	this	approach	when	asserting	what	
he	believed	the	common	good	entails:	
I	think	it	should	be	self-evident-	In	the	interest	of	the	public.	And	what	
is	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 public;	 the	 public	 interest	 is	 collectively	 of	 the	
public	 not	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 individual	within	 the	 public.	 It’s	 in	 the	
interests	 of	 the	 collective	 and	 its	 entirety.	 (Executive	 Planner,	
Development	Management	and	Forward	Planning	Experience)	
Or	as	asserted	by	another	planner,	
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The	common	good	is	in	the	best	interests	of	the	population	as	a	whole,	
so	you	kind	of	accept	that	it’s	not	going	to	suit	all	people.	But	it	should	
be	in	the	interests	of	society	rather	than	an	individual	community,	and	
it’s	 also	 in	 the	 best	 interests	 environmentally,	 socially.	 (Executive	
Planner,	Forward	Planning)	
Others	echoed	this	view	by	providing	illustrative	hypothetical	examples	of	how	this	
moral	 code	may	be	applied	 in	planning	practice.	 	 For	example,	one	 senior	planner	
whose	expertise	 lies	 in	 the	area	of	developing	planning	polices	 largely	 through	the	
development	plan	making	process	suggested	that	on	some	occasions,		
You	 have	 to	 weigh	 certain	 issues	 more.	 I	 mean	 dealing	 with	 say	 a	
residential	 group	 or	 a	 community	 and	 a	 councillor	 who	 may	 be	
representing	 them,	 that	 are	 completely	 against,	 and	 probably	 often	
sometimes	 for	 good	 reasons,	 for	 example	 a	 waste	 water	 treatment	
plant	 expansion.	 They	will	 fight	 it,	 fight	 it,	 fight	 it	 and	 absolutely	 so.		
But	there	is	a	greater	good	that	you	have	to	look	at	and	pull	that	back	
and	say	from	a	strategic	point	of	view,	this	may	be	a	bit	crap	for	you,	
we’ll	find	a	way	of	compensating	[you],	whether	it’s	a	community	levy	
or	whatever	it	is,	and	try	and	ameliorate	as	many	impacts	as	possible.	
But	at	the	end	of	the	day,	these	things	have	to	go	ahead	and	they	have	
to	go	ahead	for	the	sake	of	everybody	in	the	city	you	know,	and	it	can’t	
be	just	localised.	(Senior	Executive	Planner,	Forward	Planning)	
Hence,	a	widely	shared	and	seemingly	objective	‘moral	code’	is	advanced	in	seeking	
to	address	the	‘ethical	substance’	of	a	planner’s	potential	for	subjective	judgement.		
From	 a	 Foucaultian	 perspective,	 the	 deployment	 of	 this	 moral	 code	 may	 be	
interpreted	as	a	desire	to	resonate	with	the	contemporary	‘regime	of	truth’	rooted	
in	the	logic	of	‘technical	rationality’	that	governs	the	allocation	of	power/knowledge	
in	the	practice	of	professional	planning	(Flyvbjerg,	1998;	Lennon,	2014;	Owens	et	al.,	
2004).		Several	interviewees	mentioned	this	self-awareness	as	a	‘professional’,	with	
one	planner	who	has	worked	in	variety	of	roles	throughout	the	course	of	their	career	
summarily	noting	that,	
You	are	a	professional	member	of	staff	in	the	local	authority	and	that’s	
key	in	the	role	of	the	planner-	that	you’re	keeping	that	in	mind	all	the	
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time.	 That	 you’re	 there	 as	 a	 professional;	 you’re	 employed	 as	 a	
professional	person	to	recommend	based	on	your	assessment	of	what	
constitutes	 proper	 planning	 and	 sustainable	 development.	 (Senior	
Executive	 Planner,	 Development	Management	 and	 Forward	 Planning	
experience)	
Instantiating	this	morally	informed	concept	of	professionalism	in	planning	therefore	
necessitates	 an	 interpretation	 on	 how	 a	 moral	 code	 focused	 on	 prioritising	 the	
advancement	 of	 rational	 objectivity	 is	 applied	 in	 practice.	 	 Accordingly,	 attention	
must	be	allocated	 to	 the	activities	planners	perform	when	 seeking	 to	ensure	 their	
impartiality.	 	 In	this	sense,	focus	 is	required	on	what	Foucault	termed	‘self-forming	
activities’.	
	
Self-forming	activities	
Self-forming	 activities	 comprise	 the	 efforts	 through	 which	 subjects	 endeavour	 to	
establish	 those	 practices	 that	 they	 believe	 will	 enable	 them	 to	 meet	 their	 ‘moral	
obligations’	 in	conforming	to	the	‘moral	code’.	 	 In	this	sense,	self-forming	activities	
constitute	 the	 ethical	 practices	 that	 Foucault	 conceptualises	 as	 creating	 an	 action-
orientated	bridge	between	the	‘moral	code’	and	‘moral	conduct’.	 	Once	again,	how	
interviewees	responded	to	questioning	on	what	they	perceived	as	the	common	good	
and	what	 they	 think	 is	 the	 role	 of	 a	 planner	 revealed	 their	 views	 regarding	 those	
activities	they	believed	necessary	for	translating	into	practice	the	moral	requirement	
to	remain	neutral.		Interviewees	sought	to	guarantee	neutrality	and	thereby	advance	
correct	moral	 conduct	 by	 ensuring	 that	 they	 remained	 impartial	 in	 their	 planning	
activities	yet	attentive	to	the	potential	adverse	impacts	on	the	broader	population.		
This	view	was	illustrated	by	one	executive	planner	when	relating	that,	
You	have	to	be	really	careful	to	remain	obviously	 impartial.	 	So	 if	you	
have	a	development	that	meets	all	the	planning	regulations	but	there	
are	 impacts	 there	 from	 a	 community	 point	 of	 view,	 they	 have	 to	 be	
valid	 and	 reasonable	 obviously,	 very	 valid	 or	 reasonable	 points	 of	
objection	and	so	on.	I	mean,	I	don’t	think	about	the	developer	as	such.	I	
see	an	application.	I	see	a	building.	I	don’t	see	a	person	but	I	do	see	the	
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people	 who	 would	 be	 directly	 affected	 by	 it.	 (Executive	 Planner,	
Development	Management	and	Forward	Planning	Experience)	
This	need	to	‘remain	obviously	impartial’	was	echoed	by	several	of	the	interviewees,	
with	 many	 laying	 emphasis	 on	 how	 all	 parties	 involved	 in	 a	 planning	 application	
should	be	 treated	 equally.	 	 Such	 a	 belief	was	 succinctly	 conveyed	by	 an	 executive	
planner	working	in	the	area	of	development	management	when	asserting,	
I’m	not	going	to	give	a	planning	consultant	more	weight	than	Johnny	
who	 wrote	 his	 own	 submission	 or	 Mary	 who	 wrote	 her	 own	
submission.		But	that’s	fine.		I	would	consider	those	with	equal	weight,	
equal	value.	(Executive	Planner,	Development	Management)	
A	clear	pattern	that	emerged	from	the	interviews	was	the	perception	that	central	to	
forging	this	sense	of	professional	 impartiality	was	the	need	to	remain	consistent	 in	
one’s	planning	work.	As	relayed	by	one	interviewee,		
I	think	as	a	planner	what	I	find	is	very	important	when	you’re	dealing	
with	planning	applications	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 if	 I	 recommend	a	grant	 or	
refusal	 for	 a	 certain	 type	 of	 development	 or	 a	 certain	 element	 of	
development	 then	 I	 need	 to	 be	 consistent.	 I	 don’t	 want	 somebody	
coming	 up	 to	 me	 and	 saying,	 ‘oh	 you	 granted	 [permission]	 for	
something	and	not	for	this	one	here’,	and	 if	 I	don’t	have	a	reason	for	
that,	 that’s	 when	 I	 think	 I	 would	 have	 failed	 the	 common	 good.	 It’s	
consistency	[that]	 is	very	 important.	(Executive	Planner,	Development	
Management	and	Forward	Planning	experience)	
This	 perceived	 necessity	 to	 promote	 consistency	 in	 planning	 spans	 both	 the	
development	management	 and	 policy	 formulation	 activities	 of	 planners,	 such	 that	
most	respondents	expressed	a	view	resonant	with	the	statement	that,	‘We	have	to	
be	 consistent	 with	 our	 plans	 and	 policies,	 and	 that’s	 consistent	 across	 the	 board’	
(Interviewee	P16).		Hence,	the	idea	of	consistency	is	interlaced	with	neutrality	in	the	
sense	that	being	consistently	impartial	is	seen	as	the	means	to	exemplify	good	moral	
conduct	 in	 one’s	 professional	 planning	 activities.	 Thus,	 the	 self-aware	 practice	 of	
consistent	impartiality	is	a	self-forming	activity.		Such	steadfast	neutrality	therefore	
constitutes	 the	 aim	 or	 ‘telos’	 of	 planning	 activities	 by	 representing	 the	 ideal	 state	
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aspired	 for	 in	 ‘self-forming	 activities’	 wherein	 the	 morally	 problematic	 ‘ethical	
substance’	of	potential	subjectivity	is	resolved.			
	
Telos		
According	to	Foucault,	the	‘telos’	of	an	ethical	system	is	‘the	kind	of	being	to	which	
we	aspire	when	we	behave	in	a	moral	way’	(Foucault,	1984a:	355).		This	telos	or	end	
state	of	correct	moral	being	thereby	represents	how	planners	envisage	themselves	
as	operating	when	 they	have	 resolved	 the	potential	 for	problematic	 subjectivity	 in	
their	activities	(‘ethical	substance’)	by	engaging	in	‘self-forming	activities’	guided	by	
a	 ‘moral	 code’.	 	 For	 most	 of	 those	 interviewed	 this	 comprised	 a	 situation	 where	
planners	 consistently	and	 impartially	 ‘implement	 the	policies	and	objectives	of	 the	
development	 plan	 as	 adopted	 by	 the	 elected	 members’	 (Interviewee	 P17).	 Thus,	
there	 was	 accord	 among	 respondents	 that	 the	 telos	 of	 the	 planner	 is	 to	 be	 an	
instrument	for	the	objective	application	of	policy	made	by	elected	representatives	of	
the	community	over	which	planners	exercise	their	powers	as	impartial	adjudicators.		
This	 opinion	 was	 summarised	 by	 one	 senior	 planner	 with	 experience	 in	 both	
development	management	and	policy	formulation,	when	he	concluded	that,	
The	role	of	the	planner	is	to,	well	it’s	to	reflect	policy	and	to	lead	policy.		
The	planner	 is	 there	 to	execute	 the	policy	of	a	democratically	elected	
chamber	with	 the	 plan…It’s	 [the	 planner]	 there	 as	 an	 ambassador	 of	
democracy	to	implement	policy	made	by,	in	theory,	the	people	through	
the	councillors.	 	 It	 is	 to	seek	the	public	good	obviously.	 	 It	 is	 to	 juggle	
competing	demands	or	competing	points	of	view.		Now	most	planners	
wouldn’t	disagree	with	that.	 	(Senior	Executive	Planner,	Development	
Management	and	Forward	Planning	experience)	
Therefore,	the	morally	consummate	planner	is	one	who	can	juggle	the	multiple	and	
often	 competing	 demands	 and	 perspectives	 placed	 on	 them	 in	 a	 manner	 that	
advances	 the	public	good	and	performs	 their	professional	duties	 in	applying	policy	
authorised	 by	 democratic	 processes.	 	 In	 tracing	 backwards	 this	 chain	 of	 moral	
reasoning	it	is	thereby	possible	to	identify	how	planners	aspire	to	a	state	where	they	
can	effortlessly	exemplify	consistent	impartial	judgement.		This	is	facilitated	through	
self-forming	activities	guided	by	a	moral	code	that	prioritises	the	perceived	need	to	
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advance	 objectivity	 in	 one’s	 professional	 practice.	 	 The	 practices	 informed	 by	 this	
moral	code	thereby	enable	them	to	remedy	the	perceived	morally	problematic	issue	
of	 subjectivity	 by	 ensuring	 that	 their	 planning	 work	 is	 conducted	 from	 a	 neutral	
standpoint.		The	fact	that	operating	from	a	position	of	neutrality	serves	to	preserve,	
rather	than	redress,	imbalances	of	power	within	the	planning	system	appears	to	go	
unnoticed	by	those	who	emphasise	the	importance	of	remaining	impartial	during	the	
decision-making	process.	The	next	section	extends	this	analysis	through	an	in-depth	
Foucaultian	interpretation	of	this	interview	material.		Particular	attention	is	allocated	
to	 the	 operation	 of	 power	 in	 and	 through	 the	 work	 of	 planners.	 	 Potentially	
problematic	 ethical	 issues	 are	 identified	 and	 a	 remedy	 for	 these	 is	 offered	 via	 a	
Foucaultian	approach	to	ethics.			
Power	and	the	Moral	Subject		
The	 above	 Foucaultian	 analysis	 of	 how	 ethics	 operates	 in	 and	 through	 planning	
facilitates	an	examination	of	how	the	planner	as	‘subject’	is	‘made’.		Importantly,	this	
analysis	enables	an	exploration	of	the	effects	engendered	by	the	constitution	of	such	
a	subject.	 	This	 is	because	a	Foucaultian	analysis	pays	attention	to	how	we	occupy	
the	 subject	 positions	 that	 our	 socio-historical	 location	 presents	 to	 us.	 	 These	
positions	are	 influenced	by	the	concepts	of	 legitimacy	operative	within	a	particular	
context.	 	A	key	qualification	for	 legitimacy	 in	contemporary	professional	practice	 is	
the	capacity	to	present	arguments	grounded	in	what	are	perceived	as	valid	forms	of	
knowledge	 (Cowell	 and	 Lennon,	2014;	 Litfin,	 1994;	 Steffek,	 2009).	 	 This	 is	because	
legitimate	governance	in	modern	western	democracies	is	set	against	the	backdrop	of	
the	Enlightenment’s	legacy	wherein	the	possession	of	valid	forms	of	knowledge	is	a	
prerequisite	for	authoritatively	pronouncing	on	an	issue	(Fischer,	2003;	2009).		Such	
‘valid’	forms	of	knowledge	habitually	partition	the	world	into	apparently	self-evident	
dichotomies	 of	 true	 and	 false,	 objective	 and	 subjective.	 Furthermore,	 those	 in	 a	
position	to	enunciate	such	knowledge	are	likely	to	assume	identities	constituted	by	
power	relationships,	and	enjoy	relative	to	others,	 the	ability	 to	 legitimise	decisions	
made	 (Foucault,	 1980a).	 	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 ‘regime	 of	 truth’	 delimiting	
power/knowledge	in	modern	western	democracies,	and	thus	the	power	to	govern	in	
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such	 contexts,	 is	 set	 in	 an	 ability	 to	 underpin	 governing	 activity	 by	 an	 appeal	 to	
knowledge	which	appears	 to	have	been	conceived	 in	accordance	with	 the	 rules	of	
such	 modernist	 rationalities	 (Aronowitz,	 1988;	 Gane,	 2004;	Weber,	 1922).ii		 	 As	 a	
governing	activity	that	‘attempts	to	manage	spatial	change’	(Tewdwr-Jones,	2012:	1),	
planning	is	legitimised	by	a	‘knowledge	dependence’	(Gottweis,	2003:	256)	grounded	
on	the	‘valid’	knowledge	of	objective	assessment.		Thus,	as	demonstrated	above,	the	
evacuation	of	potential	bias	is	seen	as	a	precondition	for	the	appropriate	exercise	of	
power	 in	 planning.	 	 Consequently,	 despite	 much	 criticism	 of	 ‘technical-rational’	
planning	 (Cowell	 and	 Lennon,	 2014;	 Fischer,	 2003;	 Flyvbjerg,	 1998;	 Owens	 and	
Cowell,	 2011)	 and	 efforts	 to	 move	 beyond	 it	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 often	 contending	
theoretical	perspectives	(Campbell,	2012b;	Davoudi,	2015;	Forester,	2013;	Flyvbjerg,	
2004;	Gunder	and	Hillier,	2009;	Healey,	2005;	Hillier,	2007),	 the	persistence	of	 this	
approach	 seems	deeply	 rooted	 in	 the	perceived	necessity	 to	 legitimise	 the	 role	 of	
the	planner	by	way	of	self-presentation	as	a	neutral	adjudicator	(Lennon,	2014).			
	
This	technical-rational	approach	is	reflected	in	the	moral	code	deployed	in	the	‘self-
forming	 activities’	 of	 planning	 practice	 which	 enables	 planners	 to	 present	
themselves	as	disinterested	experts	deploying	their	knowledge	in	objectively	seeking	
to	advance	the	common	good	when	making	decisions	or	driving	policy	development.		
Of	note	here	 is	how	this	engenders	an	 implicit	belief	that	the	activities	undertaken	
by	planners	are	ethically	secure.		This	thereby	engenders	an	ethically	static	practice	
wherein	 the	 telos	 of	 an	 ‘aspired	 state	 of	 being’	 is	 conflated	 with	 the	 existing	
ontological	condition	of	the	planner.		Here,	consistency	in	the	maintenance	of	what	
is	 believed	 to	 be	 impartial	 judgment	 is	 considered	 all	 that	 is	 required	 to	 ensure	 a	
morally	 justifiable	 practice.	 	 Accordingly,	 there	 is	 no	 perceived	 need	 for	 ethical	
reflection	 beyond	 the	 boundaries	 of	 maintaining	 rational	 detachment	 in	 one’s	
planning	work.		In	essence,	the	telos	of	the	planner	is	deemed	to	have	been	reached.	
However,	 such	 a	 view	 is	 problematic	 given	 that	 several	 authors	 have	 shown	 how	
planners	regularly	adopt	ethical	stances	informed	by	subjective	values	at	odds	with	
those	 ostensibly	 presented	 as	 legitimising	 ‘objective’	 planning	 expertise	 (Lennon,	
2015;	Parkinson	et	al.,	2016;	Thomas,	1994;	Upton,	2002).		Consequently,	failure	to	
acknowledge	the	role	played	by	subjectivity	in	planning	activity	may	close	the	space	
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for	critical	attention	to	the	moral	assumptions	underpinning	planning	practice.		As	a	
result,	certain	 interests	aligned	with	the	subjective	preferences	of	planners	may	be	
privileged	in	decision-making,	even	as	the	decision-making	process	is	presented	as	a	
disinterested	technical-rational	procedure	(Flyvbjerg,	1998;	Fox-Rogers	and	Murphy,	
2014).	
	
At	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 issue	 is	 the	 foregrounding	 of	 ‘moral	 obligations’	 with	 the	
concomitant	neglect	of	‘ethical	obligations’.		As	moral	obligations	merely	refer	to	the	
bivalence	of	good	or	bad	moral	conduct	relative	to	a	moral	code,	they	reinforce	the	
seemingly	self-evident	dichotomies	of	true	and	false	that	resonate	with	assumptions	
concerning	 the	 possibility	 of	 objective	 detachment	 in	 one’s	 planning	 practice.	 	 A	
focus	 on	 fulfilling	moral	 obligations	 thereby	 helps	 to	 sustain	 the	 technical-rational	
modes	of	 practice	 that	 are	 thought	 to	 adequately	 ensure	 good	moral	 conduct.	 	 In	
contrast,	ethical	obligations	reference	the	nuanced	reflection	upon	how	to	exemplify	
moral	conduct	rather	than	simply	to	conform	to	a	pre-ordained	moral	code.		As	such,	
a	greater	emphasis	on	ethical	obligations	offers	an	opportunity	to	address	the	moral	
shortcomings	 resultant	 from	 ethical	 inertia	 in	 planning.	 	 This	 is	 because	 stressing	
ethical	obligations	would	help	rupture	the	conflation	of	the	ontology	of	the	planner	
with	the	telos	of	the	planner	that	has	occurred	consequent	on	a	preoccupation	with	
moral	obligations.		Such	rupturing	would	open	a	space	for	the	more	subtle	reflection	
on	 one’s	 relative	 location	within	 a	 field	 of	 historically	 contingent	 power	 relations.		
Hence,	 emphasising	 ethical	 obligations	may	 help	 planners	 recognise	 the	 inevitably	
context-informed	 subjectivity	 of	 their	 perspectives	 (Campbell,	 2006).	 	 This	 would	
thereby	 stimulate	 debate	 on	 the	 telos	 of	 a	 planner	 as	 theorists	 and	 practitioners	
seek	 to	 identify	 self-forming	 activities	 that	 facilitate	 a	 ‘knowing	practice’	 (Kemmis,	
2005)	of	conscious	ethical	developmentiii.			
	
From	a	Foucaultian	perspective,	such	a	self-reflective	practice	involves	negotiating	a	
path	through	the	pervasive	relations	of	power	that	constrain	our	thinking	and	doing.		
Such	 a	 path	 can	 be	 located	 consequent	 on	 Foucault’s	 rejection	 of	 the	 ‘oppressive	
hypothesis’	 (Foucault,	 1990:	 7-8)	 by	 contending	 that	 power	 can	 enable	 innovative	
thought	and	action.		This	positive	potential	of	power	can	be	exercised	by	identifying	
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and	 emphasising	 those	 emancipatory	 norms	 and	 institutions	 which	 assist	 the	
emergence	 of	 new	 self-forming	 activities	 that	 facilitate	 reflection	 on	 the	 very	
processes	by	which	we	are	‘made’	subjects.		The	freedom	to	engage	in	such	ethical	
reflection	 is	 made	 possible	 by	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 how	 power	 is	 understood	 by	
Foucault	as	an	 immanent	 force	 in	all	 relationships.	 	Specifically,	all	power	relations	
must	presuppose	 freedom,	as	 these	 relations	are	only	 conceivable	on	 the	premise	
that	through	resistance	to	the	force	of	power,	a	form	of	freedom	is	possibleiv.		Thus,	
the	 freedom	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 resistance	 that	 is	 an	 essential	 condition	 for	 the	
presence	 of	 power	 supplies	 us	 with	 scope	 to	 contemplate	 the	 influence	 of	 such	
power	upon	us,	our	peers	and	our	 society.	 	Hence,	 through	 resisting	 ‘the	given’	 in	
social	 relations,	we	 are	 free	 to	 seek	 alternative	ways	 of	 thinking	 and	 doing.	 	 Such	
freedom	 is	 an	 inherent	 attribute	 of	 Foucault’s	 understanding	 of	 how	 power	 and	
ethics	are	intrinsically	connected.		As	he	notes,	‘Freedom	is	the	ontological	condition	
of	ethics.		But	ethics	is	the	considered	form	that	freedom	takes	when	it	is	informed	
by	 reflection’	 (Foucault,	 1997:	 284).	 	 Accordingly,	 ethical	 engagement	 involves	
seeking	to	enhance	one’s	freedom	from	those	norms	that	inhibit	self-awareness	on	
how	 one	 is	 constituted	 as	 a	 subject	 through	 the	 context-contingent	 alignment	 of	
power	 relations.	 	 This	 critique	 enables	 us	 to	 unmask,	 understand,	 and	 thereby	
consciously	change	for	the	better,	the	‘ontology	of	the	present’	(Foucault,	1986:	96).		
As	Foucault	argued	in	one	of	his	final	essays,	
The	critical	ontology	of	ourselves…has	to	be	conceived	as	an	attitude,	
an	ethos,	a	philosophical	life	in	which	the	critique	of	what	we	are	is	at	
one	and	the	same	the	historical	analysis	of	the	limits	that	are	imposed	
on	 us	 and	 an	 experiment	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 going	 beyond	 them.	
(Foucault,	1984c:	50)	
This	 critical	 attention	 to	 how	we	 are	 constituted	 as	 subjects	 and	 how	we	 seek	 to	
constitute	our	subjectivity	thus	necessitates	that	we	discard	the	context	 insensitive	
notions	 of	 objective	 self-knowledge	 inherited	 from	 the	 Enlightenment’s	 ‘Cartesian	
moment’	(Foucault,	2005:	14).			
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Conclusion	
This	paper	has	advanced	the	view	that	ethical	issues	are	at	the	heart	of	planning.		In	
doing	so	it	has	sought	to	identify	what	it	means	for	a	sample	of	planners	operative	in	
an	 Irish	 context	 to	 conduct	 themselves	 morally	 in	 their	 professional	 activities.		
Specifically,	 the	 paper	 deployed	 Foucaultian	 theory	 to	 explore	 how	 and	 why	 the	
planner	 is	 constituted	 as	 an	 ethical	 subject,	 and	 the	 effects	 this	 exerts	 on	 the	
practice	of	planning.		The	paper	accords	with	Foucault’s	own	direction	that	his	later	
examination	of	ethics	be	used	as	a	lens	through	which	to	read	his	earlier	analysis	of	
power	 and	 knowledge.	 Hence,	 the	 paper	 complements	 but	 does	 not	 duplicate	
existing	‘governmentality’	studies	that	seek	to	demonstrate	how	understanding	the	
‘conduct	 of	 conduct’	 (Foucault,	 1983:	 220)	 is	 essential	 to	 comprehending	how	 the	
management	 of	 behaviour	 is	 influenced	 by	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 context	 specific	
influences	 emanating	 from	 an	 array	 of	 heterogeneous	 sources	 	 (Certomà,	 2015;	
Huxley,	2006;	Lemke,	2012;	Pløger,	2008).		The	paper	extends	this	work	to	make	an	
original	 contribution	 to	planning	 theory	by	employing	aspects	of	Foucault’s	oeuvre	
not	normally	referenced	in	planning	literature.	 	 In	particular,	the	paper	endeavours	
to	demonstrate	the	value	of	Foucault’s	later	work	on	ethics	as	a	conceptual	lens	for	
examining	how	the	constitution	of	the	moral	self	influences	the	practice	of	planning.			
	
By	 demonstrating	 how	 moral	 self-understanding	 is	 always	 positioned	 within	 a	
context	that	could	have	been	otherwise,	this	critique	requires	that	planners	forsake	
the	 self-deception	 that	 they	 can	 consistently	 perform	 their	 activities	 with	
impartiality.		Instead,	it	demands	that	planners	acknowledge	how	they	cannot	evade	
‘situated	ethical	 judgement’	(Campbell,	2006)	that	is	positioned	within	a	‘regime	of	
truth’	 consequent	 on	 an	 historically	 contingent	 arrangement	 of	 power.	 	 Such	 a	
‘knowing	 practice’	 (Kemmis,	 2005)	 necessitates	 that	 self-understanding,	 moral	
codes,	 self-forming	 activities	 and	 the	 telos	 towards	 which	 one	 aims	 are	 located	
‘within’	 particular	 practice	 configurations,	 and	 hence	 are	 inherently	 provisional.		
Relinquishing	such	pretentions	to	neutrality	does	not	mean	that	we	lose	the	capacity	
to	justify	moral	norms	and	ethical	evaluations.		What	it	means	is	that	we	recognise	
how	our	forms	of	moral	reasoning,	and	consequently	our	self-perceptions	as	moral	
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subjects,	are	shaped	by	our	position	within	a	field	of	power/knowledge.		While	such	
recognition	would	surely	deflate	the	power	of	moral	certainty	in	planning,	and	may	
consequently	 temper	 its	 privileged	 position,	 this	 recognition	 would	 concurrently	
inflate	 the	 aptitude	 of	 planners	 to	 distinguish	 the	 ways	 that	 power	 works	 in	
marginalising	 certain	perspectives	 (Grange,	2013).	 	As	 such,	 this	 recognition	would	
supply	planners	with	the	tools	of	immanent	critique	that	may	enable	them	to	attune	
their	 practices	 in	 ways	 that	 supplant	 the	 ethical	 passivity	 of	 Panglossian	 self-
interpretations	with	a	commitment	to	moral	 improvement.	 	Hence,	a	critically	self-
reflective	approach	to	the	interactions	between	power	and	the	moral	subject	offers	
an	opportunity	to	enhance	the	ethical	sensitivity	of	planning.	
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i	Semi-structured	qualitative	 interviews	were	 carried	out	with	 20	 local	 authority	 planners	 to	 obtain	
views	 relating	 to	 ‘the	 role	 of	 the	 planner’	 and	 opinions	 regarding	 both	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
‘common	good’	justification	for	planning	and	on	what	may	constitute	the	common	good	in	planning.		
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All	 interviewees	 were	 drawn	 from	 four	 separate	 planning	 authorities	 in	 the	 Great	 Dublin	 Area,	
Ireland.		These	local	authorities	were	selected	on	the	basis	that	they	provided	a	spectrum	of	planning	
contexts,	 socioeconomic	 profiles	 and	 geographic	 locations	 comprising,	 inner	 urban,	 suburban	 and	
rural	contexts.	Non-probability	sampling	methods	were	used	to	 identify	 interviewees	 in	each	of	 the	
local	 authorities.	 	 Variations	 in	 the	 employment	 grade	 of	 interviewees	 was	 sought	 to	 counter	 the	
potential	for	sample	bias.		To	further	ensure	against	potential	of	sample	bias,	a	relatively	even	mix	of	
planners	 from	 different	 divisions	 of	 each	 planning	 authority	 were	 interviewed.	 	 Specifically,	
interviewees	were	 sourced	 from	 those	working	within	 the	 development	management	 and	 forward	
planning	 (policy	 development)	 divisions	 of	 each	 of	 the	 local	 authorities.	 	 In	 all,	 13	 planners	 were	
interviewed	 with	 development	 management	 experience	 while	 12	 were	 interviewed	 with	 forward	
planning	 experience	 –	 5	 planners	 had	 experience	 spanning	 both	 development	 management	 and	
forward	planning.		Care	was	also	given	to	ensure	that	there	was	no	gender	bias	in	the	data	collected,	
with	9	male	and	11	female	planners	being	interviewed	in	total.	All	interviews	were	approximately	60	
minutes	in	duration.		‘In	vivo’	codes	derived	from	words/phrases	used	by	respondents	were	employed	
in	the	analysis	of	the	interview	material.	Consequently,	the	coding	scheme	was	data-driven.	All	coding	
was	 undertaken	 by	 one	 of	 this	 paper’s	 authors,	 thereby	 enhancing	 consistency	 in	 the	 coding	
procedure	and	the	robustness	of	the	data	analysis	process.			
ii	Flyvbjerg	(1998)	extends	this	idea	by	showing	that	it	is	the	‘appearance’	of	such	rationalities	rather	
than	a	genuine	concern	with	their	use	that	is	important	in	power-imbued	governing	activity.			
iii	Davoudi	 (2015)	 has	 also	 provided	 a	 cogent	 justification	 from	 a	 more	 pragmatic	 philosophical	
perspective	on	the	need	to	conceptualise	‘planning	as	practice	of	knowing’.			
iv	This	 is	 an	 important	 issue	 in	 Foucault’s	 later	 writings	 that	 many	 of	 those	 who	 accuse	 him	 of	 a	
deterministic	reading	of	subjectivity	fail	to	recognise.		Such	critics	generally	do	not	acknowledge	how	
Foucault	 believed	 that	 his	 later	 writings	 on	 ethics,	 freedom	 and	 subjectivity	 were	 essentially	
addressing	 issues	 he	 had	 only	 partially	 explained	 in	 his	 earlier	 works	 on	 power,	 discipline	 and	
knowledge.		See	Flynn	(2010)	for	a	further	discussion	of	this	issue.		
